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Computational Drawing: Code and Invisible Operation
Brogan Bunt
Abstract
Drawing upon my own experience in developing the algorithmic drawing project, Loom, this paper 
considers the relationship between conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of drawing in 
computational art. It is concerned particularly to reflect upon the nature of this aesthetic labour, 
which involves not only programming but also the blind space of procedure.
Fig. 1. Loom, 2011, Brogan Bunt, archival ink-jet print (author's image)
Subdivide an initial polygonal shape into a set of smaller polygonal shapes. Apply the same 
process to each of the polygons in the new set. Continue recursively.
This instruction could be regarded as the concept informing my recent exhibition of algorithmic 
drawing work, Loom. The work explores aspects of recursive geometric subdivision. Simple shapes 
are subdivided into further smaller shapes. Applied many times over, complex patterns and textures 
emerge. I have reservations, however, about expressing things in these terms, since my aim is to 
question the notion of a purely conceptual space that precedes and dominates the sphere of technical 
implementation and execution. The instruction above echoes the form of a Sol LeWitt wall drawing 
statement, yet it can hardly be said to be purely conceptual. It is expressed in linguistic terms. It is 
mediated through the impurity and materiality of language. More specifically, in conceiving the 
aesthetic possibility of polygonal subdivision, I am drawing upon particular programming 
constructs and dimensions of computational process. My creative ideas are shaped by the thinking 
of data structures, algorithmic pathways and iterative patterns.
However, my interest here is not so much in demonstrating the various ways in which my 
conceptual drawing statements are inevitably affected by the space of programmatic logic and 
implementation, but in attempting to reconsider the relationship between the conceptual and non-
conceptual aspects of computational making. Drawing upon the model of the Jacquard loom, my 
work positions computational processes as mechanical means of weaving virtual cloth from simple 
algorithmic patterns. My aim is to engage with the compelling power of computation, which is 
linked for me to the mystery of its dumb operation - its strange invisible labour. The computer is 
bound by regimes of instructional necessity, yet the opaqueness, scale and speed of its processes 
suggest an uncanny agency. This paradox is vital to my work. The abstract algorithmic schema – 
whether expressed as a conceptual statement or as a formal body of programming code – is never 
sufficient on its own. It must be played out on a surface. It must pass from the uncertain 
consciousness of code to the uncertain unconsciousness of iterative procedure. It is precisely in the 
tension between algorithmic conception and repetitive, non-reflective enactment that the process of 
drawing takes shape.
Computational Labour
The images in my Loom exhibition depend upon a work of programming. However, another 
dimension of labour, the computational labour of machine execution (drawing), is also relevant. 
How can we make sense of this work? Can it even properly be considered a genuine form of 
labour?
Within the Hegelian-Marxist tradition, labour serves as a vital index of human rational and social 
activity. It represents the sublimation of immediate gratification towards the goal of producing 
useful things [1]. It is something that we undertake and endure with other ends in mind. In this 
sense, a key aspect of human labour relates to the awareness that we could be spending our time 
differently, that we are sacrificing the here and now for some other delayed space of superior 
satisfaction. This aspect of conscious, steadfast and resigned choice is clearly absent in mechanical 
forms of labour. The labour of the machine is unreflective. It simply proceeds. It is precisely this 
feature of machine labour that attracted Alan Turing when he set out to critique David Hilbert's 
axiom of decidability [2]. The distinctive characteristic of the finite state machine is that it proceeds 
step by step, without any contemplation of alternative possibilities. It is this incapacity to reflect 
that finally leads to its undoing. A recursive logic pushes it towards reflection and it becomes 
trapped in an internal contradiction. Very importantly, however, Turing's conception of computation 
does not represent an effort to distinguish the special character of human labour and thought. 
Instead it serves to clarify the mechanical character of axiomatic mathematical procedure. In a 
critical and ironic manner, it demonstrates the relevance of the machine in conceiving the 
apparently pure workings of mathematical logic.
If machine labour appears especially alien, it is because it represents an aspect of ourselves that we 
are especially keen to avoid. It serves as the uncanny double of the repetitive, mechanical, 
materially determined and non-reflective dimensions of human action. In this manner – in its 
curious, unsettling agency – machine labour disturbs our self-image as free and rational agents. 
Within this context, it is worth recalling that Aristotle distinguishes between thinking and 
unthinking dimensions of techne (making). The habitual character of manual labour, which can 
proceed without a clear understanding of underlying causes, is contrasted to the conceptually 
informed practice of the master-artist.
Inanimate things bring about the effects of their actions by some nature, while manual 
workers do so through habit which results by practicing. Thus master-artists are 
considered wiser not in virtue of their ability to do something, but in virtue of having 
the theory and knowing the causes. [3]
Here the rift between human and mechanical labour takes clear social shape. Hegel also emphasises 
this social dimension, tracing its historical and dialectical development. He argues that the rise of 
industrial society transforms labour into a vehicle for alienation. In becoming social (and 
economic), in shifting from the sphere of individual and local production towards the general 
commodity market, labour grows increasingly distant from any space of immediate concrete 
realisation or exchange. Endlessly abstracted and endlessly deferring immediate gratification, 
concrete labour becomes decoupled from human scales of meaningful action. The rise of industrial 
manufacturing processes – of machine labour and of human labour rendered machinic – only 
exacerbates this sense of alienation: “[the worker] becomes through the work of the machine more 
and more machine-like, dull, spiritless. The spiritual element, the self-conscious plenitude of life, 
becomes as empty activity.” Machine labour produces what Hegel terms a “life of death moving 
within itself”. [4]
Despite this negative assessment of the implication of machine labour, from my point of view the 
interesting feature is that Hegel does not position mechanical labour as an entirely alien force (an 
external imposition). Instead, an intrinsic dialectic is acknowledged. The contours of modern 
alienation are immanent within human labour at the outset. They are evident in the initial split from 
immediate appetitive being. In its dimension of stoic self-abnegation, human labour takes shape as a 
paradox. It is both constitutive of rational human being and indicative of a turn away from the 
simplicity of integral organic being. In this sense the separation of the machine – the dull, dead, 
spiritually vacuous motion of its instrumental functioning – appears as an exacerbation or 
materialisation of a tendency that will have always been, in some sense, properly human.
Perfunctory Execution
In my experience, programming represents a liminal space. It projects an intimate and entangled 
relationship between human and machinic processes of coding and decoding, agency and 
determination. Nonetheless, software programming is typically conceived in terms of notions of 
conceptual priority and anteriority. Here, an interpretation of the legacy of conceptual art becomes 
relevant. The work of Sol LeWitt, for example, is often regarded as emblematic of a neat, 
hierarchical split between conceptual and material-practical aspects of making. In an article about 
his 2004 {Software} Structures exhibition, Casey Reas positions Sol LeWitt’s wall drawings as a 
model for his own software art practice.
The relation between LeWitt and his draftsperson is often compared to the relation 
between a composer and performer, but I think it’s also valid to look at the comparison 
between a programmer and the entity of execution. [5]
Software programming is likened to the conceptual field of LeWitt’s written wall drawing 
instructions, while the field of program execution (of computational process) is likened to the 
manual labour of realising the instructions on any specific wall. At the same time, however, Reas 
acknowledges a key point of difference. LeWitt’s instructions lack the precision of programming 
code. They are conveyed in natural language and directed towards human readers. Rather than 
entirely restricting the space of execution, they work to suggest a focused field of creative 
possibility. Reas is keen to regard software art in similar terms, aiming to identify a form of 
conceptual software practice that precedes actual software programming, providing a generative 
conceptual basis for all manner of actual algorithmic drawings.
The work develops in the vague domain of image and then matures in the more defined 
structures of natural language before any thought is given to a specific machine 
implementation. [6]
He employs the term “software structure” to designate this pre-computational, creative-conceptual 
field and associates it with a potential for intuition and expressive freedom.
I want programming to be as immediate and fluid as drawing and I work with software 
in a way that minimizes the technical aspects. I often spend a few days creating a core 
piece of technical code and then months working with it intuitively, modifying it 
without considering the core algorithms. I use the same code base to create myriad 
variations as I operate on the fundamental code structure as if it were a drawing – 
erasing, redrawing, reshaping lines, moulding the surface through instinctual actions. 
[7]
No doubt LeWitt’s wall drawing work is full of curious paradoxes in which the machinic and the 
intuitive intersect, but it seems odd to harness it in the interest of describing a notion of expressive 
and de-technologised computational drawing. LeWitt is associated much more with a critique of the 
modernist concern with subjective, materially-based expression. As Ana Lovatt suggests, “[a]gainst 
prevailing notions regarding the immediacy, directness and primacy of drawing, LeWitt devised a 
drawing practice that was always already mediated by technologies of reproduction and 
communication.” [8]
Now while Reas never positions software structures as literally material, he conceives them very 
much in terms of “the vague domain of image”. [9] In this manner, the notion of software structure 
recalls the mute and intuitive aesthetics of formalist modernism. It envisages an intimate, 
traditionally expressive realm of creative conceptualisation that is grounded in the space of 
perceptual manifestation. In this respect, Reas reinforces the boundaries between the intuitive and 
the procedural. The domain of conceptual expression, of software programming, is positioned as a 
form of alienation from intuitive conceptualisation. It manifests the underlying concept in an 
estranged language that is properly distinct from the inner sanctum of creative conceptual 
imagination. A conceptual space is delineated, but in terms that precisely correspond to the 
reassuring visibility of the material image.
I prefer another reading of LeWitt's wall drawing project. Rather than indicating a neatly 
hierarchical division between the conceptual and the operational, his work suggests a play of mutual 
imbrication, mirroring and exchange. Moreover, rather than the conceptual appearing as a 
subjectively grounded sphere of autonomy and dominance and the executable as an utterly 
derivative space of expressive material determination, their relation is articulated in profoundly 
curious and unsettling terms. Consider this classic statement from his 1967 “Paragraphs on 
Conceptual Art”.
In conceptual art the idea of concept is the most important aspect of the work. When an 
artist uses a conceptual form of art, it means that all the planning and decisions are 
made beforehand and the execution is a perfunctory affair. The idea becomes a machine 
that makes the art. [10]
This appears to belittle the sphere of actual making. The work of manual drawing is portrayed as 
trivial and secondary. However, there is a an ambivalence. The term “perfunctory” suggests a task 
that is mechanically performed, without any sense of subjective investment. This strangely opens up 
an affinity to the nature of conceptual practice. LeWitt insists that “the idea is a machine that makes 
the art.” [11] The conceptual then is also interpreted in mechanical terms. Both the conceptual and 
the executable are stripped of subjectivity. They both preserve a procedural, non-reflective aspect. 
In his 1969 “Sentences on Conceptual Art”, LeWitt describes the ideational blindness of the 
conceptual: “The artist cannot imagine his art, and cannot perceive it until it is complete.” [12] 
Ultimately, the intuitive machinery of the conceptual enters into relation with the machinery of 
making.
28. Once the idea of the piece is established in the artist’s mind and the final form is 
decided, the process is carried out blindly. There are many side effects that the artist 
cannot imagine. These may be used as ideas for new works.
29. The process is mechanical and should not be tampered with. It should run its course 
[13]
The value of the “perfunctory” is clearly evident here. It is a productive dimension of mechanism 
that tests and inspires new concepts. Although apparently distant and distinct, the spaces of 
conception and execution find themselves allied and linked. They share a common antagonism to 
the thinking of subjective expression. Together, as paired coordinates, they suggest a notion of 
drawing that reaches beyond the human, struggling to find effective means to engage with 
dimensions of blind process.
Shimmering
I will conclude by briefly considering an alternative model for thinking the relation between 
conceptual and non-conceptual dimensions of computational practice. It is drawn from a specific 
mode of painting within Australian Indigenous art. Howard Morphy describes the technique of 
Eastern and Central Arnhem Land painting: “painting is seen as a process of transforming a surface 
from a state of dullness to that of shimmering brilliance (bir’yunhamirri).” [14] He describes a 
clearly defined set of steps:
1. The painting surface is covered in an overall wash (typically red-ochre). 
2. The key forms are outlined in yellow and black and basic figurative elements are coloured 
in. 
3. Large portions of the surface are covered in “cross-hatched” infill with a special long brush. 
4. The final work involves “outlining the figures and cross-hatched areas in white to create a 
clear edge which defines their form.” [15] 
Stage one is a straightforward process. Stage two depends upon high-order artistic skill and a close 
understanding of relevant representational traditions and protocols. Morphy notes that the second 
stage is performed relatively quickly by “a senior person”. [16] Stage three is the most time-
consuming, demanding technical skill but less demonstrable cultural knowledge. The final stage 
draws the painting together and is closely directed by the senior artist.
My specific interest is in the sophisticated mediation that this artistic process enables between 
elements of conceptualisation and mechanical technique. The term ‘mechanical’ has to be used 
carefully here. It is less, in this instance, to liken Aboriginal painting to the characteristic forms of 
industrial production than to pinpoint a dimension of iterative, non-conceptually grounded process 
within Aboriginal art-making. It is not as though the work of producing cross-hatched infill does not 
have conceptual, aesthetic resonance, it is that it gains this resonance and this potential to shape a 
shimmering aesthetic surface by casting itself in terms of a repetitive articulation of time and space. 
The work has a ritual, performative aspect. In relation to the cross-hatching, Morphy argues that 
“Yolngu are not merely producing an aesthetic effect but moving the image towards the ancestral 
domain. The cross-hatched surface of the painting reflects the power of the ancestral being it 
represents, the quality of the shininess is the power of the ancestral beings incarnate in the object.” 
[17] In this sense, the work becomes a means of summoning and invocation. Slow and mechanical, 
it shapes a real and affective alignment with dimensions of ancestral being and opens up the 
possibility of manifestation. From this perspective then, processes of conceptualisation and 
mechanical technique are mutually imbricated. The distinction between concept and technique does 
not take a binary shape, but is instead structured as a play of mediation within the overall creative 
process. Concepts emerge as much from the labour of mechanical repetition, which serves as a field 
of intimate communication and connection, as from the processes of mechanical repetition are 
inevitably inflected by the rich context of cultural meaning.
This example indicates other ways of making sense of the relationship between conceptualisation 
and practical making within art; suggesting the need to re-evaluate the non-reflective character of 
making and to acknowledge the dynamic exchange between concept and mechanism within art. The 
relation between the two is no longer cast in binary and hierarchical terms – rather they appear 
congruent and enmeshed. I would argue that something like this is also what the creative 
programmer experiences. The close relation between writing, compilation and running that 
programming entails fosters a new, uncertain relation between the regimes of conceptual logic and 
mechanical operation. The programmer seeks not only to choreograph and determine computational 
processes but also, at the same time, to explore an uncanny space in which the already alien 
algorithmic concept passes into the executable, non-reflective event and phenomenon.
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